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NOTE AND COMMENT
CoNSTITUTION.ALITY OF TH:i;: LA For.r.r:TTr: AMENDMENT 'ro THS !NTERNAI.

1921.-The United States Senate on November 5, 1921,
inserted in the Revenue Act, then before the Senate, a provision that taxpayers in their income tax returns must specify what state and municipal
bonds they hold, or else be subject to a penalty of five per cent. That provision was dropped out in conference, but it will come up again, and it is
well to look at its constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches.
Doubtless any reasonable requirements in a tax report, so as to show
what tax shall be paid. may be enacted by Congress. Thus the supreme
court of Connecticut has held (Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain,
94 Conn. 47, affirmed 254 U. S. n3, but not involving this point) that a
state in levying ·an income tax on foreign corporations doing business in
the state may require them to file with the state tax authorities a copy of
their federal income tax returns.
But that is an entirely different proposition from a requirement that
shall give information as to matters not bearirtg on the tax. Income from
state or municipal bonds is not taxable by the federal government, and hence
the federal income tax reports have nothing whatsoever to do with income
lliWr:NW LAW OF
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from state or municipal bonds. The inquiry is not pertinent, and hence the
proposed requirement looks like an impertinent prying into private affairs.
Constitutional law will not tolerate that. The Supreme Court in the case
of Kilboum v. Thomps01i, 103 U. S. 168, said (page 190): "We are sure
that no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either
House, unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House
has jurisdiction to inquire, and we feel equally sure that neither of these
bodies possesses the general power of making inquiry into the private affairs
of the citizen." Even in an investigation by the United States Senate as to
whether any Senators had speculated in stocks, the value of which would
be affected by pending legislation, the Supreme Court, while holding that a
witness must answer questions (Re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661, 667), said that
the Act of Congress relative to compelling witnesses to answer "refers to
matters within the jurisdiction of the two Houses of Congress, before them
for consideration and proper for their action; to questions pertinent thereto;
and to facts or papers bearing thereon." The Supreme Court in Interstate
Com. Com. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 478, approved the Kilboitm decision
to the effect that "Neither branch of the legislative department, still less
any merely administrative body, established by Congress, ·possesses, or can
be invested with, a general power of making inquiry into the private affairs
of the citizen." The court also approved the statement of Jaw of Mr. Justice
Field in Re Pacific Railway Commission, 32 Fed. Rep. 241, 250, that "of all
the rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential
to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that
involves, not merely protection of his person from assault, but exemption
of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny
of others. Without the enjoyment of this right, all others would lose half
their value." In the Matter of Eames, 204 N. Y. 108, where a witness before
a legislative committee refused to answer questions in regard to his hold·
ings of stock in a certain corporation, the court pointed out that the New
York Code of Civil Procedure provision limited the questions to those
which were "pertinent." When the Interstate Commerce Commission asked
Mr. Harriman about his purchases of stock, and he refused to answer, the
Supreme Court upheld him, and said in regard to the power of investigation
claimed by the Commission, "No such unlimited command over the liberty
of all citizens ever was given, so far as we know, in constitutional times,
to any commission or court." Harriman v. Interstate Com. Com., 2II U. S.
407. The latest decision of the Supreme Court as to an individual's private
papers is Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 2g8, decided February 28, 1921.
There the court held that the private papers obtained by a government representative from the office of a person under pretense of a friendly call
during his absence is an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment,
and such papers cannot under the Fifth Amendment be used to convict him
of a crime. The court further held that a search warrant is proper only
to obtain papers to prevent injury to the public from their use and not
merely to obtain them as evidence against a defendant. The court said
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(page 304) : "It has been repeatedly decided that these Amendments should
receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encr.oachment upon
or 'gradual depreciation' of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible
practice of courts or by well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive officers." The act of a man's wife in allowing government officers to
enter his home without a warrant, but on their demand for admission, to
make a search for liquor held in violation of the revenue laws, is unconstitutional, under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Amos v. United
States, 255 U. S. 313 (1921). It is true that recently the Supreme Court
has held that the government might retain and use books and papers seized
by private detectives and turned over to the government as evidence, in a
prosecution for fraudulent use of the mails, this not being a search and
seizure by the government itself, but two Justices dissented and pointed out
that this mode of procedure would not encourage respect for the law and
the government. Burdeau v. McDowell, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 574Now if the income from state and municipal bonds is constitutionally
exempt from federal taxation (as it is), what right has Congress to demand
a statement of how much that income is? How is such a statement pertinent to the federal tax? Constitutional law does not sanction inquisitorial
invasions of the right to privacy in personal affairs, especially where the
information demanded cannot change or aid congressional or executive or
judicial action. The inquiry is for some extraneous purpose, apparently
curiosity. Even a stockholder cannot examine corporate papers "to gratify
idle curiosity." Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U. S. 148.
A side light is thrown on this subject by the decisions under the Fifth
Amendment that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." While the limits of search warrants and subpoenas duces tecmn are not yet clearly defined, yet illegal practices in searches
and seizures have been emphatically condemned by the courts of last resort.
The search and seizure of a man's private papers to obtain evidence to
recover a penalty or forfeit his property or convict him of a crime is unconstitutional. So also is an Act of Congress authorizing United States courts
in revenue cases to require the production in court of such private books
and papers. Boyd v. United State~ n6 U. S. 616, involving a proceeding
in rem to forfeit certain goods alleged to have been fraudulently imported
without paying duties. The seizure of the letters and correspondence of an
accused person in his house during his absence and without his authority
by a United States marshal, holding no warrant for his arrest or for the
search of his premises, is unconstitutional and the court will order such
letters and papers to be returned. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383.
Furthermore, such books and papers cannot be subpoenaed before a grand
jury, nor copies or photographs of them used as evidence against the accused
person. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385. In New
York it is held that a statute which authorizes state officials to enter the
place of business of an individual and examine all of his books and papers,
to ascertain whether he has attached state stamps on transfers of stock,
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violates the constitutional prov1s1on that an individual in a criminal case
cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. People v. Reardon,
197 N. Y. 236.
Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed., p. 369, *304, says (note 1) :
"The scope of this work does not call for any discussion of the
searches of private premises, and seizures of books and papers, which
are made under the authority, or claim of authority, of the revenue
laws of the United States.,~ Perhaps, under no other laws are such
liberties taken by ministerial officers ; and it would be surprising to
find oppressive action on their part so often submitted to without legal
contest, if the facilities they possess to embarrass, annoy and obstruct
the merchant in his business were not borne in mind. The federal
decisions, however, go very far to establish the doctrine that, in matters of revenue, the regulations Congress sees fit to establish, however
unreasonable they may seem, must prevail."
If Judge Cooley were now alive he would see the law vindicated and
its violations rebuked, as shown by the above decisions.
Hence it may well be questioned whether the La Follette amendment
would have been constitutional. It was not to get information for legislation, inasmuch as Congress cannot levy an income tax on interest from
state or municipal bonds. It has too remote a bearing upon a possible constitutional amendment, especially as the states will not voluntarily by such
an amendment increase the rate of interest on their bonds and make the
federal government a present of that increase; neither will they vote for
such an amendment unless it is reciprocal and allows them to tax the
income from federal bonds.
'J.'he mere fiat of Congress that such information must be given ,\.ould,
of course, not be conclusive. In the tax case of Eisner v. 11-faccmber, 252
· U. S. 189, the court said (page 206) : "Congress cannot by any definition it
may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power- to legislate, and within
whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised."
EVIDENCE-PROOF REQUIRED TO ADMIT BOOKS OF ACCOUNT.-"Now they
[negotiable instruments] are not goods, nor securities, nor documents for
debts, nor are so esteemed, but are treated as money, as cash, in the ordinary course and transactions of business, by the general consent of mankind, which gives them the credit and currency of money to all intents and
purposes." Lord Mansfield in Miller v. Race, I Burrows 452. By a process
something like that by which the negotiability of promissory notes and bills
uf exchange became recognized in the Jaw of contracts, the rules of evidence seem to be accommodating themselves to the necessities and customs
of trade.
"A shop-book was allowed in evidence in indebitatus assumpsit, in a taylor's bill, it being proved that the servant that writ the book was dead, and
this was his hand, and he accustomed to make the entries, and no proof was
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required of the delivery of the goods." 12 VIN. ABR. 89. This of course
applies when the one making the entry had personal knowledge of the transaction. The same rule is followed in Sovereign Camp W. 0. W. v. Bass,
204 Ala. 28. ·
It is when the one making the entry had no personal knowledge of the
truth of the transactions recorded, but made them from the reports of other
employees who delivered the goods or performed the services, that the courts
have experienced difficulties. leading to various rules as to when such
accounts are admissible. "Evidence of beer delivered was this, the draymen
came every night to the clerk of the brewhouse, and gave him account of
the beer they had delivered out, to which the draymen set their hands, and
that the drayman was dead, but that his hand was set to the book. And
that was held good evidence of a delivery." Price v. Torrington, 2 Ld.
Raym. 873. If the transactor is unavailable, dead, insane, or, in some jurisdictions, permanently in another jurisdiction, the entries are admissible if
the entrant is able to testify that the entries were made by him in the regular course of business, and that they are correct reproductions of the
reports made. There is agreement that these extra-judicial statements are
admissible because the circumstances of necessity and the guaranty of trustworthiness entitle them to be received in evidence as e.."<Cceptions to the hearsay rule. Nichols v. Webb, 8 Wheat. 326; Poole v. Dicas, I Bing. N. C. 649.
There is a type of unavailability which the nature of modern business
has created. It is that where an entry is made only after a series of transactions, each perhaps requiring the attention of a different employee of the
party who desires to put the final record, which constitutes the original
entry, in evidence. The unavailability of those having personal knowledge
of the several transactions culminating in the items may be said roughly to
spring from these causes: (I) the transactors are unknown; (2) the transactors are a transient class, often gone when the record is produced in court;
(3) there is impracticability in taking a number of employees from their
shop duties to be witnesses.
In Kent v. Garvin, I Gray (Mass.) 148, the clerk who kept the book
testified that it was a book of original entries, that the one who delivered
the goods habitually reported to him from memoranda made at the time,
and that the witness copied these reports into the book offered in evidence.
The transactor was absent from the jurisdiction. For the want of his testimony, the books were held inadmissible, the court using this language :
"It is manifest that an important link in the chain of evidence is wanting.
The clerk who made the entries had no knowledge of the correctness of any
charge on the book The case therefore rests on the mere unsupported
evidence of a third person, whose fidelity and accuracy there are no means
of ascertaining and testing. It is in its nature mere hearsay testimony."
It js not enough, then, in the opinion of the Massachusetts court, to show
that the record was fairly kept under circumstances which naturally would
make it accurate. This rule is again applied in Delaney v. Framingham
Gas, Fieel and Power Co., 202 Mass. 359; A.tlas Shoe Co. v. Bloom, 2og
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Mass. 563; Kaplan v. Gross, 223 Mass. 152. It should be noticed that there
was not a strong case of unavailability presented in Kent v. Garvin, supra,
for apparently there were but two employees; also a deposition could have
been gotten from the absent person. This was not true of Kaplan v. Gross,
supra, yet the court refused to depart from the precedent. See, too, M a1isficld v. Gieshee (Me., 1921), u4 Atl. 2g6.
The usual practical impossibility of bringing those persons into court
from whose personal knowledge and reports another, whose duty it was,
wrote them in the book of original entries, has induced other courts to lay
down a still different rule of admissibility for book accounts. It is enough
in such jurisdictions to show that the account book. offered was made in the
regular course of business, if the system of making the entries was explained
and it appeared that accuracy would probably follo\V from it. The elements
of necessity and trustworthiness-always to be found before extra-judicial
statements are admissible-were deemed to be present.
Among the pioneer cases in which this more liberal rule was adopted
was Givens v. Pierson's Adm%., 167 Ky. 574- The bookkeeper of a large
establishment testified that as a clerk made a sale he entered it on a ticket,
from which the witness would copy the transaction on the books. The book·
keeper had no other knowledge of the transactions; he could say nothing
as to the correctness of the items made on the tickets by the clerks. To
admit the books as evidence of the transaction, no other proof was required
than to show the method used in making them, and to identify them. It
was immaterial, the court said, whether or not those who m~de the memoranda on the tickets could be brought into court to te.stify. The demands
of modern business for such a rule were expressly stated as causing this
decision. "And so this change in business methods has made necessary the
broadening of the rule admitting book entries as substantive evidence, and
now the test of the admissibility of this class of evidence does not depend
so much on whether the entry offered in evidence was made on a permanent
book at the time the transaction actually occurred by the clerk who attended
to it as it does on the fact that it was made in the usual manner in which
the business is conducted, although the entry may be made by a person
whose only information is gained from the tickets furnished him by the
clerks or other persons who actually attended to the business,'' said the court.
See also, White Sewing Machine Co. v. Gilmore F1trnitiere· Co., 128 Va. 630;
Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. R. R. Commissioners, 86 S. C. 91; Loveman,
Joseph & Loeb v. McQ1eem, 203 Ala. z8o; Bush v. Ta-y,•lor, 136 Ark. 554;
Montgomery & 1l11ellen Lmnber Co. v. Ocea1i Park Scenic Ry., 32 Cal. App.
32. In the last case, the books were allowed in evidence when one who was
familiar with the method of keeping them testified as to that, and identified
the books. In Gallatin Co. Farmers' Alliance v. Flamiery, 59 Mont. 534
this was held to be error, since the bookkeeper was available as a witness.
The former holding is undoubtedly correct; anyone with knowledge of these
facts should be allowed to testify to them.
What may be considered a further liberalization of the rule is found in
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the late case of Billingsley v. U.S. (C. C. A., 1921), 274 Fed. 86.. The books
were identified by the witness Levy, who assisted in keeping them; this witness also acted as a salesman and testified that he had sold goods to the
defendants. But it does not appear that he had any personal knowledge that
the goods entered in the books had been delivered to the defendant. He
also said that the books were kept in the regular course of business. The
court said: "These books were properly kept * * * in the regular course
of business by a person employed for that purpose. It was wholly unimportant whether the witness Levy made any or all the entries therein or not,
and equally unimportant whether or not he had any recollection in reference
to particular sales." The requirement here is less than that of cases following Give1is v. Pierson's Adm.z-., supra, in that no description of the method
of keeping the books was required. This should be demanded by the courts.
There is a possibility that under such a lenient rule of admissibility as in
the Billingsley case self-serving documents may be introduced in evidence.
Compelling the party offering the book to explain the system by which it is
kept places no unreasonable burden upon him and at the same time affords
the court a fair opportunity of deciding upon the trustworthiness of the book.
The courts in the main have met a changed situation well, and in
changing a rule of evidence to meet altered circumstances have made a
concrete application of the words of Chief Justice Shaw in Norway Plains
Co. v. B. & M. R. R. Co., I Gray (Mass.) 263: "It is one of the great
merits and advantages of the common law that instead of a series of detailed
practical rules*** the common law consists of a few broad and comprehensive'
principles, founded on reason, natural justice, and enlightened public policy,
modified ~nd adapted to the circumstances of all the particular cases which
fall within it. * * * When new practices spring up, new combinations of fact
arise, and cases are presented for which there is no precedent in judicial
decision, they must be governed by the general principle applicable to cases
most nearly analogous, but modified and adapted to new circumstances by
considerations of fitness and propriety, of reason and justice, which grow
out of these circumstances."
G. E. L.
MARITIMF:

LAW-PERSONALITY

OF

SHIP-Izu11rnNITY

oF

GoVSRNMSN'l'I

PRoPSRTY.-The recent opinions of the Supreme Court in the three cases
of the Western Maid, Liberty, and Carolinia1i (U. S. Sup. Ct., January 3,
1922) emphasize the non-liability of national ships in cases of collision.
'fhe W estem 11-faid, owned by the United States and manned by the navy,
was in collision in New York harbor. The Liberty was a pilot boat under
charter to the government and had a collision in the harbor of Boston.
The Carolinian, also a chartered ship, had done similar damage in Brest,
France. The two latter had been re-delivered to the owners, and the former
to the U. S. Shipping Board, when the libels were filed, so that the process
in no way interfered with the possession of the sovereign. In each case the
Supreme Court issued its extraordinary writ of prohibition to prevent district courts from exercising jurisdiction.
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It had been the general opinion that ships of the government incurred
the same liabilty as those of individuals on account of maritime transactions,
although that liability might not be enforced where it would be necessary
to take the res out of the possession of the government by any writ or
process of the court. Davis, IO Wall. 15. The practice prevailed, to some
extent at least, of filing a libel in rem, without the prayer for process, and
requesting an appearance on behalf of the United States, in analogy with
the English practice! described in The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, I54- The existence
of the maritime lien was assumed and suits in rem have been frequent,
subject to the rule that property of the government might not be attached
unless it could be done without disturbing the possession of the United
States. Thus the books contain suits for general average, U. S. v. Wilder,
3 Sumner 3o8; salvage, U. S. v. Morg01i, 99 Fed. 572; sailor's wages, St.
Jago de C11ba, 9 Wheat 409; and material-men's claims, Rev. C1ttter No. I,
Brown's Admiralty 76. All cases of this nature pre-suppose the existence
of a maritime lien, inherent in the res itself. If the government consented
to the suit, or if the suit could be prosecuted without disturbing its possession, the lien was enforced as in ordinary cases. The present cases, however, proceed on the negation of the lien itself, "Legal obligations that exist
but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law, but that are
elusive to the grasp." The result would seem to be that henceforward
there can be no proceeding in rem against property which was in the possession of the United States at the time the cause of action accrued. Unless
a maritime lien arises out of the transaction itself, admiralty jurisdiction
in rem is unthinkable, for such liens· are not created by subsequent agreements. _Nothing subsequent may supply an original lack of vitality. It is
difficult to reconcile the decision with the Siren, S1tpra, the Davis, IO Wall
15, and U. S. v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196.
The brilliant writer of the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Holmes,
answered the fundamental question, What constitutes the law? by "The
prophecies of what the courts will -do in fact, and nothing more pretentious,
are what I mean by the law" (Collected Legai Papers, 173). In the same
address, the body of reports, treatises and statutes are called "the sybilline
leaves in which are gathered the scattered prophecies of the past upon the
cases in which the axe will fall." The metaphor is a striking one; according
to Vergil (ZE11eid, III, 452), the Sibyl wrote her prophecies on the leaves of
trees and so arranged them within the cave that the approach of inquirers
blew them into such confusion that their meaning became incomprehensible,
-inconS1tlti abemit sedemque odere Sibyllae. The line will fit more than
one admiralty practitioner whose clients are asking opinions about cargoes,
for instance, lost in a collision between a car-ferry operated by the DirectorGeneral of Railroads and a Navy transport allocated to the Shipping Board.
The goal of the law is stability in fundamentals and the maritime law has
enough reports and treatises and statutes to furnish a more substantial
foundation than foliage, but its students are finding more truth than poetry
in the metaphor. This will be more evident if the decision indicates a modi-
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fication of the underlying doctrine of the personality of the ship. The
minority of the court, in a vigorous dissent, would seem apprehensive of
this result. Such a consequence would be unfortunate. The basis of
admiralty jurisdiction, and the only reason. for not blending it with the
common Jaw, is its proceeding in rem, and that proceeding depends on the
theory of maritime liens, which, in itself, rests upon the individuality of the
ship. From the standpoint of business, the ship -cannot sail without credit
and it cannot have credit without maritime liens. These are f;miliar platitudes, but they are derived from the inherent nature of the business itself.
Another is that capital cannot be secured for the business unless the investor
can be assured of a definite limitation of liability, and this ultimately depends
upon the personification of the ship. Tradesmen will not furnish a ship
with supplies nor salvors aid her in peril unless they have the assurance of
the lien. The importance of the lien is quite as important in matters of tort,
although not as conspicuous, since, for example, it is one of the elements
of the underwriter's rate of premium for the running-down clause in the
marine policy. At a time when we are making a colossal effort to establish
a mercantile marine, with ships publicly, and not privately, owned, it will
be unfortunate to impair their credit and segregate them further from the
settled channels of the general maritime law. The majority opinion, it is
true, warns us that "we must realize that however ancient may be the traditions of maritime law, however diverse the sources from which it has been
drawn, it derives its whole and only power in· this country from its having
been accepted and atlopted by the United States. There is no mystic overlaw to which even the United States must bow." There is, however, a very
plain and definite law, to which even the United States must bow if it is
to succeed in maritime affairs, and that is the general maritime law, or
common law of the sea, and the established practices and requirements of
the business.
G. L. C.
MARITIMS LAW-SHIP UNDER CoNS'l'RUC'tION-WoRKMAN's CoMPENSAnoN.

-In Ship Compaiiy v. Rhode (U. S. Sup. Ct., January 3, 1922) the Supreme
Court reaffirms the rule that locality is the test of admiralty jurisdiction in
matters of tort, even if the injury was received upon a ship in the process
of construction, so long as it was afloat. The tort was consummated upon
navigable waters; that satisfies the criterion. The fact that the ship was
not yet within the jurisdiction (because of the ship-building dogma) is immaterial ; locality controls.
The second question was whether the e..'Cclusive features of the Oregon
Workmen's Compensation Act abrogated the right to recover damages in
admiralty. That act entitles the injured workman to receive specific payments and provides that "the right to receive such sums shall be in lieu of
all claims against his employer." In the present case the workman had sued
the employer in admiralty, and the Oregon statute is held to preclude the
su'it because it prescribes an exclusive remedy for the injury involved. It
is generally held that what is a discharge of a debt in the country where it
is contracted is a discharge of it everywhere, and that where an obligation
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ex delicto to pay damages is discharged and avoided by the law of the
country where it was made, the accessory right of action is in like manner
discharged and avoided. Phillips v. Eyre, L. R. 6 Q. B. 1. Under this rule,
the state statute would control in all non-maritime transactions, because the
parties had contracted with reference to it. The construction of a ship is
no different from the construction of a house, so far as the Compensation
Act is concerned, and where the injured party comes into' a court of another
jurisdiction his rights are measured by the lex lows delicti.
G. L. C.
THE "HoT TRAIL'' IN'.i.'O Msx1co AND ExTRADI'.i.'ION ANALOGms.~The
recent decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Doming11ez v.
State, 234 S. W. 79, has given us an important precedent and also a valuable
example of the solution of novel problems by means of analogies. A detachment of the military forces of the United States had been authorized by the
War Department to enter Mexico on the "hot trail" in pursuit of bandits.
While following a "hot trail" this detachment arrested Dominguez, a native
citizen and resident of Mexico, and returned with him to the United States.
It developed later that he was not one of the bandits who made the "hot
trail." Dominguez was thereupon turned over, without his consent, to the
authorities of Texas, and was indicted and convicted for a murder previously
committed in Texas. It was held upon appeal that the prisoner might resist
trial for the offense charged in the indictment until such time as he should
voluntarily subject himself to the jurisdiction of the United States or until
the consent of the Mexican government to his trial should be obtained.
There was no precedent in the decided cases. Counsel argued for the
application by analogy of the principles which control in the decision of
extradition cases. In reliance upon the extradition analogies the case was
decided.
In general, apart from treaty, independent states are said to be under
no international obligation to surrender fugitives from justice. HYDS, INT.
LAW, I, § 3n; Mooru;, DIGSST, IV, 245; MooRS, EXTRADITION, I. 21 ff. The
facility with which criminals may find asylum i11 other countries has led
most states to conclude treaties in which provision is made for the extradition of fugitives charged with any one or more of an enumerated list of
crimes. See the Extradition Treaty with Mexico of 1899, art. 2, and the
Supplementary Extradition Convention of 1903, MALLOY, TRSATISS, I, n84,
n93. See also HYDS, I, §§ 313 ff. The extradition of fugitives is thus a
concession and compromise defined in treaties, a mitigation of strict right
in the common interest of all civilized states. Comity and good faith among
nations require that the concession should not be overtaxed or abused. It
follows, according to the rule; generally approved, and expressly affirmed by
the Supreme Court of the United States, that "a person who has been
brought within the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of proceedings under
an extradition treaty. can only be tried for one of the offenses described in
that treaty, and for the offense with which he is charged in the proceedings
for his extradition, until a reasonable time and opportunity have been given
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him, after his release or trial upon such charge, to return to the country
from whose asylum he has been forcibly taken under those proceedings."
United States v. Rauscher, n9 U. S. 407, 430. See HYDE, I, § 322; Mooim,
EXTRADITION, I, 2I9 ff. See also Johnson v. Browne, 205 U. S. 309. Compare
Collins v. O'Neil, 2I4 U. S. n3.
While the rule of the Rauscher case has frequently been so stated as to
emphasize the extradited prisoner's right to resist trial upon any other
charge than the one upon which he was extradited, it is submitted that the
prisoner's right is only incidental and a convenient safeguard against the
possibility that the confidence of the state of asylum may be abused. See
United Stai es v. Ra11scher, n9 U. S. 407, 4I9-22; Ker v. Illinois, II9 U. S.
436, 443; MooR.E, EXTRADITION, II. 1042. This analysis finds strong support
in the circumstance that the rule of the Rauscher case does not apply
between the several states of the United States where considerations of
international comity and good faith are not involved. Lascelles v. Georgia,
148 ·u. S. 537; Mooim, EXTRADITION, II, 1035 ff. See 20 MICH. L. Riw.
449. It is further supported by the circumstance that the rule does not
apply where the prisoner has been abducted or kidnapped from the state of
asylunL See Ker v. Illinois, II9 U. S. 436, decided at the same time as the
Rauscher case. HYDE, I, § 321 ; Mooim, EXTRADITION, I, 294 ff. The abduction or kidnapping, as in the Ker case, is a violation of jurisdiction of
which the asylum state may justly complain; but it seems clear that the
recognition of a right in the prisoner to resist trial, so far from operating
to prevent a breach of faitl:~ between nations or to afford the affronted state
adequate satisfaction, would only add insult to injury.
If the prisoner is regularly extradited, therefore, as in the Rauscher
case, he may be tried only for the offense for which he is extradited; but
if he is kidnapped, as in the Ker case, considerations of international comity
and good faith afford him no protection. Of these two rules, entirely consistent if the reasons therefor are understood, which is the better suited to
the novel situation presented in Dominguez v. State? Viewing the situation
superficially, an analogy with the Ker case would have been more plausible.
Inasmuch, however, as the pursuit and arrest of bandits in Mexico without
the consent of the Mexican government would have been a gross violation
of Mexican jurisdiction, the Court indulged the presumption-with entire
propriety, it is submitted-that instructions from the War Department to
follow the "hot trail" were issued pursuant to some kind of agreement with
Mexico. This presumption brought the case within the reason and hence
within the rule of United States v. Rauscher'. Considerations of international comity and good faith are quite as important in case of the pursuit
and capture of bandits pursuant to agreement as in case of extradition
under treaty. Had one of the bandits pursued been captured, he should not
have been tried for any other offense than that which started the "hot trail."
No greater right was acquired as regards Dominguez, who was wrongly
arrested on the mistaken assumption that he was one of the bandits pursued.
E.D.D.

